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The Shortest Universal Turing Machine Implementation Contest

                          ANNOUNCEMENT

                          23 Dec - 2008

  http://www.mathrix.org/experimentalAIT/TuringMachine.html

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Contest Overview

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In the spirit of the busy beaver competition though related to program-size complexity, we are pleased to announce the “Shortest Universal Turing Machine Implementation Contest”.

The contest is open-ended and open to anyone. To enter, a competitor must submit a universal machine implementation written in the language specified in the contest web site (C++) with smaller size values than the latest  record published on the web page.

In order to take part in this competition it is necessary to submit the source code, to be compiled using the compiler program and version specified in the contest web site. It is important that you provide documentation of your code, either in an attached file or as commented text in the source code file.

Each submitter must agree to be bound and abide by the rules. Submissions remain the sole property of the submitter(s), but should be released under the GNU General Public License (GPL)  so we may be permitted to make them available on  this web site for downloading and executing.

Rules

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http://www.mathrix.org/experimentalAIT/TuringMachine.html (General Rules section)

Team composition

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Players may enter alone or as teams of any size. Anyone is eligible to enter.

Subscribe to the Newsletter

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We have a mailing list that we will use to keep participants informed of news about the contest. You can subscribe to this mailing list at any time:

Subscribe at http://www.mathrix.org/mailinglist/?p=subscribe

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Organizers

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Hector Zenil (IHPST and LIFL, Paris 1 University and Lille 1 University)
Jean-Paul Delahaye (LIFL, Lille 1 University)

Why research on the universality of the Wolfram 2,3 Turing machine (http://www.wolframscience.com/prizes/tm23/) and the small universal Turing machine  is relevant for modern computer science:

* New techniques for proving universality are being developed (Alex Smith’s novel approach for unbounded computations from arbitrary lengths and non-periodic initial configurations).
* Completely new universal systems have been discovered (cyclic tag- systems, bi-tag systems).
* Such research provides a better understanding of universality,  its limits, its  underlying principles and its necessary and sufficient conditions.
* It is a base for actually building universal devices when only a few elements can be used, e.g. in nanotechnology or molecular computation.
* Simple/small machines may be more easily/effectively embedded in other systems.
* The old discovery/invention duality question comes to the fore: It sheds light on how simple universality is, how frequently it occurs, whether  it is engineered or not, whether  one builds universal computation or finds it in the universe.
* It could shed light on the relative feasibility of  universal Turing machines based on different tape configurations (e.g. blank characters, repetitive words, non-repetitive with computationally simple backgrounds) as actual physical systems.  At present it is not at all clear why one ought to  favor blank characters over other possible real-world backgrounds, such as “noise.”
* Questions of size and complexity  arise: It would be interesting, for instance, to find out whether there is a polynomial (or exponential) trade-off between program size and and the concept of simulating a process.
* Some questions  on algorithmic complexity arise: Will the encoding always be more complex if the machine is simpler? All theorems in algorithmic information theory depend on additive constants, which depend on the sizes of typical universal Turing machines. What is the impact of different generalizations of universality on algorithmic complexity and what is the role of  encoding in such a measure?
* Some questions arise on the relation between several variants of universality definitions: Is there an effective and efficient encoding for each non-periodic encoding preserving universality? If so, how does this impact their complexity? Is there a non-periodic encoding with blank characters for each periodic blank word encoding, and what would the impact of such  an encoding be on the size/complexity of the Turing machine in question?

The field is active and still an important area of research. Several computer science conferences include talks on small computational systems. For instance, Computability in Europe (CiE) and Machines, Computations and Universality (MCU) included such talks this year, focusing in particular on reversible cellular automata and universal Turing machines.

Here are some references from the small Turing machine community, some of them very recent:

[1] Manfred Kudlek. Small deterministic Turing machines. Theoretical Computer Science, 168(2):241-255, November 1996.
[2] Manfred Kudlek and Yurii Rogozhin. A universal Turing machine with 3 states and 9 symbols. In Werner Kuich, Grzegorz Rozenberg, and Arto Salomaa, editors, Developments in Language Theory (DLT) 2001, vol. 2295 of LNCS, pp. 311-318, Vienna, May 2002. Springer.
[3] Maurice Margenstern and Liudmila Pavlotskaya. On the optimal number of instructions for universality of Turing machines connected with a finite automaton. International Journal of Algebra and Computation, 13(2):133-202, April 2003.
[4] Claudio Baiocchi. Three small universal Turing machines. In Maurice Margenstern and Yurii Rogozhin, editors, Machines, Computations, and Universality (MCU), volume 2055 of LNCS, pp. 1-10, Chisinau Moldavia, May 2001. Springer.
[5] Turlough Neary and Damien Woods. Four small universal Turing machines. Machines, Computations, and Universality (MCU), volume 4664 of LNCS, pp. 242-254, Orleans, France, September 2007. Springer.
[6] Yurii Rogozhin. Small universal Turing machines. Theoretical Computer Science, 168(2):215-240, November 1996.
[7] Shigeru Watanabe. 5-symbol 8-state and 5-symbol 6-state universal Turing machines. Journal of the ACM, 8(4):476-483, October 1961.
[8] Shigeru Watanabe. 4-symbol 5-state universal Turing machines. Journal of Information Processing Society of Japan, 13(9):588-592, 1972.
[9] Stephen Wolfram. A New Kind of Science. Wolfram Media, 2002.

I will post more later on Alex Smith’s contribution after the proof he provided to prove the universality of Wolfram’s 2,3 Turing machine.

The original questions were posted here.

From Dr. Seth Lloyd’s answers it is clear that:
1) he is assuming the Deutsch quantum computing model, which is Turing reducible and
2) he is assuming that quantum particles encode a finite amount of information, so that they are completely discrete in every possible sense, including: space/time, mass, energy, momentum, and any other possible physical value.

1 and 2 are, by the way,  standard views in both fields, quantum computing (defined by David Deutsch) and quantum mechanics (as defined by several authors). From 1 and 2 it can be deduced that Seth Lloyd indirectly implies that the universe is Turing computable (since the only difference between a quantum computer and a Turing machine -disregarding the usual fact about the infinite tape- is the run time, a fact borne out by his answers). Regarding 2, most quantum quantities and solutions to equations suggest that there are minimum values, namely the Planck time and the Planck length, a fact which assorts well with a discrete scenario. However the issue is commonly bypassed by physicists and by the theory itself. In other words, quantum mechanics seems to be consistent with both a continuum and a  discrete universe and does not offer final evidence or an ultimate theoretical conclusion one way or the other. In fact it is usual among physicists to think of  superposition as an entanglement in a space continuum, which would allow  a particle to be in an infinite number of  states simultaneously.

From 1 and 2 we can conclude that Church’s thesis–in both its weak and strong non-physical and physical versions, which we will discuss in a separate post– remains intact  even when Dr. Lloyd’s approach is closer to a physical basis (an accepted modern model of the universe) and of course the empirical data (which supports quantum mechanics itself). His chain of reasoning is basicaly as follows:

a&b->c:

a) the universe is completely describable by quantum mechanics
b)  standard quantum computing completely captures quantum mechanics
c) therefore the universe is a quantum computer.

He proved a relation between a and b, which probably puts the standard (or some standard) theory of quantum mechanics and the standard quantum computing model in an isomorphic relation with each other. Here “standard” means that some assumptions were made.

Here is a literal transcription of the answers to my questions given by Dr. Seth Lloyd:
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A: A quantum computer differs from a Turing machine in that its bits are quantum bits, and so can exist in a superposition. In addition, it can be instructed to put those bits in superpositions. These two features make a quantum computer apparently much more powerful than an ordinary Turing machine. What a quantum computer does is still Turing computable, but a typical quantum computation of T steps on N qubits requires O(2^N) bits on a classical Turing machine, and O(T 2^2N )logical operations. That is, it takes a Turing machine exponential amounts of time and space to simulate a quantum computer or quantum Turing machine. (Compare the definition of universality: a universal Turing machine can simulate any other Turing machine in polynomial time.)
So a quantum computer is apparently more powerful than a classical computer.
There is a perfectly good definition of a quantum Turing machine (basically, a Turing machine with qubits and extra instructions to put those qubits in superposition, as above). A universal quantum computer is a physical system that can be programmed (i.e., whose state can be prepared) to simulate any quantum Turing machine. The laws of physics support universal quantum computation in a straightforward way, which is why my colleagues and I can build quantum computers. So the universe is at least as powerful as a universal quantum computer. Conversely, a number of years ago I proved that quantum computers could simulate any quantum system precisely, including one such as the universe that abides by the standard model. Accordingly, the universe is no more computationally powerful than a quantum computer.

A: As long as a quantum particle encodes 3, 4, or M states, where M is a finite number, then the computational picture remains the same (this is also true classically). Now, it is a fact that a physical
system with finite energy confined to a finite volume of space has only a finite number of discrete states. So we are OK.
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“Now, it is a fact that a physical system with finite energy confined to a finite volume of space has only a finite number of discrete states.”—I wish the obviousness of this final remark were readily apparent to me.

Dr. Seth Lloyd’s work is very compelling, and I am engaged in a project inspired by ideas related to those he expounds here—mining the computational universe to uncover Lloyd’s programmer monkeys. But I find that his theory of the universe– which by the way I agree with, though it may sometimes seem otherwise– assumes no less than any other conception of the universe, which leaves space for continued thinking on evocative hypotheses, including Church’s, even as we attempt to hack the universe.

Lloyd’s thesis adds to the conception of the Universe as a Turing computer an important and remarkable claim (albeit one that depends on the conception of the quantum computer), viz.  that the Universe is not only Turing computable, but because it is constituted by quantum particles which behave according to quantum mechanics, it is a quantum computer computing its future state from its current one. The better we understand and master such theories, the better prepared we would be to hack the universe in order to perform the kind of computations -quantum computations- we would like to perform.

I would agree with Rudy Rucker too as to why Seth Lloyd assigns such an important role to quantum mechanics in this story. Rudy Rucker basically says that being a subscriber to quantum mechanics, Lloyd doesn’t give enough consideration to the possibility of deterministic computations. Lloyd writes, “Without the laws of quantum mechanics, the universe would still be featureless and bare.” However, though I am one among many (including Stephen Wolfram) who agree  that it is unlikely that the universe is a cellular automaton, simply because cellular automata are unable to reproduce quantum behavior from empirical data (but note that Petri and Wolfram himself attempt explanations of quantum processes based on nets), there’s  absolutely no need to rush headlong into quantum mechanics. If you look at computer simulations of physical systems, they don’t use quantum mechanics as a randomizer, and they seem to be able to produce enough variations to feed a computational universe. Non-deterministic randomness is not neccesary; pseudorandomness or unpredictable computation seem to be enough.

Ist das Universum ein Computer?
http://www.dtmb.de/Aktuelles/Aktionen/Informatikjahr-Zuse/
Germany, November 2006, Informatik Jahr
Deutschen Technikmuseum Berlin
From Konrad Zuse’s Invention of the Computer to his “Calculating Space” to Quantum Computing.

Lesson One: For someone with a hammer in his hand the world seems to be a  nail. Joseph Weizenbaun.

Lesson Two: Knowing the input and the transition function of a Turing machine we know everything about it. Marvin Minsky.

Dr. Zuse’s futuristic drawing

- The first talk entitled  ”What Can We Calculate With?” by Prof. Dr. Bernd Mahr from the Technische Universitat of Berlin was a very good introduction to the standard theory of computation based on Turing’s model and classical mathematical logic. His remarks on the time when computing arose from math because the Greeks discovered they were unable to compute the square root of 2 were interesting. He pointed out some evident but not always explicit facts: Calculation has a subject (the individual who calculates), an object (what is calculated),  a medium (how it is calculated), and a symbolic representation (the language -binary, for instance). His use of the Leibniz medallion for explaining   starting points, ending points and transitions in a calculation was elementary but interesting (transitions: intermediate calculations). Further explanations of reversibility and non-linearity using transition nets were also illuminating. The context of a calculation (or computation) and the strong relation between the computation itself and its context is  such that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them. Since any process can be seen as an object in itself, the context can become the calculation and the context of the context too. In some way, as we know, the concept of calculation is a constraint of a part of a calculation, and then it is defined in terms of an input, an ouput and a transition. He pointed out too that behind many of these complicated systems there is a Turing machine. It  is no longer visible from the top, but it is there.

Dr. Konrad Zuse

- Dr. Horst Zuse’s  talk titled “Konrad Zuse’s Calculating Space (Der Rechnende Raum)”:
Dr. Konrad Zuse’s son, Dr. Horst Zuse made some interesting remarks about his father’s book “Calcualting Space”,  in which  Dr. Zuse proposes studying  the universe as a digital system, specifically a cellular automaton. Dr. Horst Zuse is a professor at the Technische Universitat of Berlin and his personal webpage can be found at: www.cs-tu-berlin.de/~zuse and www.zuse.info

Dr. Konrad Zuse’s son, Dr. Horst Zuse

Dr. Zuse’s father’s main  question was: “Is Nature Digital, Analog or Hybrid?” It seems that he tended to answer “Digital,” proposing a No-Yes value language (binary). His thoughts were published in the Nova Acta Leopoldina. He evidently did acknowledge that there could be problems attempting to reconcile an explanation of the Universe in terms of Cellular Automata with Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity.

According to Konrad Zuse, laws of physics could be explained in terms of laws of switches (in the computational sense). Physical laws are computing approximations captured by the formulas in our models. He saw that differential equations could be solved by digital (hence discrete) systems.

Dr. Carl Adam Petri at the Berlin conference

- Dr. Carl Adam Petri (yes, the creator of the Petri nets!) on “Rechnender Netzraum” or “Computing Net Universe”:
According to Dr. Petri, at the Planck length quantum computing can be described by digital systems using combinatorial models (net models, kennings, combinat), and therefore the universe can be studied using discrete nets which are even capable of explaining quantum and relativistic fundamentals like Bell’s theorem and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. That would mean that discrete systems (for instance those proposed by Stephen Wolfram) would suffice to explain even quantum and relativistic phenomena.

According to Petri, measurement is equivalent to counting. For instance in S.I. one second is 9192631770 Cs periods. In fact Norbert Wiener proposed some axiomatics of measurement.

The correspondence of Petri nets with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle arises from the limitations of our observational capacities when carrying out measurements. When two different types of observations are performed, -for example momentum p and position q- we can only see p or q in a chain of succesive events related by a causality net. His nets as well as his explanations of such phenomena are very neat and elegant. The relevant slides  on causality and linear logic may be found  at:
http://www.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/TGI/mitarbeiter/profs/petri/slides/
He also distributed a CD with his slide presentation at the conference.

For Petri, the Universe is a Petri Net.

Dr. Seth Lloyd’s presentation at the conference in Berlin, Germany

- Dr. Seth Lloyd’s talk entitled “The Universe is a Quantum Computer”:
According to Dr. Seth Lloyd, professor at MIT, because quantum mechanics is the most fundamental and foundational theory of the universe,  assuming it would lead us to conclude that  the whole universe is a quantum computer computing itself. The input consists of basically random processes (which he characterizes using the metaphor of  programmer monkeys) and the outcome is all that we see around us. Because an elementary particle interacts with others and changes its state, he argues that each particle can be seen as information, as a qubit (for quantum binary digit), which unlike a bit  can be in 0,1 or both states at the same time according to the quantum property known as  entaglement or superposition. When a particle interacts with other particles they change their states according to a quantum logical gate.

Therefore, his conclusion is that the universe is not only a computer but a quantum computer. However some questions arise:

1. What does he mean by quantum computing? According to the standard model (by Deutsch) quantum computing is Turing computable (disregarding run time). If Lloyd is assuming the standard model then the universe is indeed a quantum computer, but even more remarkably (since we have scientific and philosophical hypotheses like the Turing thesis) it is Turing computable. However, if he is assuming the more general quantum mechanics model, let’s say the standard model in physics (which basically assumes the possibility of harmless continuity rather than inquiring into it) he is saying that the universe is not a computer (since the term derives  from what we mean by Turing computable and hence covers  digital computers too). So the assumptions made are significant and cannot be glossed over if one wishes  to argue convincingly that  the universe is  a computer in some standard sense. If what we  assume to be computing is something that seems to be deterministic or rule-based, the concept becomes fuzzy and  additional remarks need to be made.

2. What if a quantum particle encodes more information than just a 1 or 0 for the spin or any other quantum property? Let’s say a third value, or even worse, a non-computable number of values. In quantum mechanics for example, the superposition of a particle assumes an infinite and non-countable number of places since it is in all the spectra at the same time. If space/time is a continuum then it is evidently in a non -countable number of positions, which leaves us with  a non-computable model, or at least with something that’s neither a Turing-computable model nor a standard quantum-computable (namely Deutsch) model. And this is not a simple assumption since it requires anotherTuring-type thesis which in the final analysis does not answer the most fundamental  question, i.e. whether the universe is a computer or not and if it is, what kind of computer (in the computational power sense) it is.

I raised these questions with Seth Lloyd and I will be posting his answers soon.

Seth Lloyd at the conference in Berlin

A remarkable idea proposed by Seth Lloyd concerned “hacking the universe”. As Charles Bennett used to say, a computer is a handicapped quantum computer. So if Lloyd is right, a computer is not only a handicapped quantum computer but it is not taking advantage of the full computational power of the universe and it is just patching the universe instead of hacking it, as it would be in its power to do. By contrast, a quantum computer uses some particles that are already computing “something” (nothing less and nothing more than the processes in the universe ) to perform the computation that we want it to perform. It can be said to be  ”hacking the universe” in Lloyd’s terms.

On the other hand, if the notion of programmer monkeys is valid it should be possible to test it experimentally. Under the supervision of M. Jean-Paul Delahaye, computer science professor at the University of Lille I (http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/) we are undertaking this task. We are exploring  Lloyd’s quantum computational universe (or at least a handicapped but representative part, the recursive computational universe), applying some complexity measures (universal distribution, average-case complexity or Levin’s measure) in order to uncover the monkeys behind the Universe, or in other terms, to analyse the average distribution of randomly discrete systems with random inputs.

Is Seth Lloyd falling into the carpenter’s problem of thinking that the universe is a nail and the moon made of wood?  Is it because he is a quantum computer scientist that he thinks the universe is a quantum computer? He argues of course that the charge is unfair, but then we have been told by Dr Petri  that the Universe is in fact a Petri Net which probably  needs neither strong randomness nor quantum mechanics!

Here  is a video online in which he explains much of this:
http://www.edge.org/video/dsl/EF02_Lloyd.html

Dr. Zuse’s futuristic drawing 2

- Jurgen Schmidhuber reprised his algorithmic approach to the theory of everything in his talk entitled   “The program that computes all computable universes”.
Jurgen Schmidhuber’s major contribution probably is his Speed Prior concept, a complexity measure similar to Algorithmic Information Complexity, except that it is based on computation speed and not program length. i.e. the fastest way of describing objects rather than the shortest.
There is more information on his website: http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/ (where he includes an unfavorable review of  NKS) and in his slide presentation on the Speed Prior at: http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/speedprior/sld001.htm
Of course Schmidhuber himself has identified a problem with the Prior measure: If every possible future exists, how can we predict anything?

Other interesting talks on philosophical issues: If the Universe is a computer, therefore the human mind should be a computer too.
Is “the Universe is a  computer” a metaphor?
My answer: The metaphor is “The Universe is not a Computer”

Lesson Three: Metaphors can be reversed.

Kovas Boguta’s  talk was titled ”Is the Computer a Universe?” In it he pointed out the richness of mining the computational universe of simple programs.

Because we were together during the gala dinner I had an interesting exchange with Dr. Konrad Zuse’s son, Dr. Horst Zuse (Also at our table were the Technikmuseum director Dr. Dirk Bondel and  my colleague Kovas Boguta from Wolfram Research, among others). He shed some light on his father’s interactions with Alan Turing ( none apparently),  with von Neumann (some interaction regarding the controversy over who first built a digital computer and concerning von Neumann’s architecture, which  our current digital computers do not conform to, the ALU being separated from the memory as it is in Zuse’s conception but not in  von Neumann’s original design).

Zuse’s Z1 first computer “the input device, something equivalent to the keyboard, at the Technikmuseum in Berlin”

Kurt Godel workshop for studying his legacy and writings. Lille, France, May 19-21, 2006

My thoughts, ideas, references, comments and informal notes:

- The wheel machine, a machine for real computation which I am proposing -as a thought experiment- in a forthcoming paper  on the Church-Turing thesis -Yes, one more paper on the CT thesis!- with comments on Wilfried Sieg’s paper entitled “Church Without Dogma: Axioms for Computability”

- “In case Cantor’s continuum problem should turn out to be undecidable from the accepted axioms of set theory, the question of its truth would loose its meaning, exactly as the question of the truth of Euclid’s fifth postulate in Euclidian geometry did”. Godel replies: “It has meaning anyway, as Euclid’s fifth postulate gave rise to other now accepted mathematical fields.”

- Godel Gibbs Lecture and his dicotomy on absolutely undecidable propositions and the computational power of the human mind (Turing did great work… but he was wrong when he proposed his formal theory as a model of human thought…)

- New contacts and references: Olivier Souan, Rudy Rucker, Karl Svozil

Mark van Atten’s “On Godel’s awareness of Skolem’s lecture”.
Rick Tieszen

- Herbrand on general recursive functions, letter to Godel.

- Leibniz’ influence on Godel’s arithmetization?

- Sources: Godel Editorial Project. Firestone Library, Princeton University. I.A.S. Marcia Tucker, librarian for Godel papers.

- Godel’s concept of finite procedure as the most satisfactory definition of computation. “A machine with a finite number of parts as Turing did” or “finite combinatorial procedure” as a definition of an algorithm, mechanical or computational procedure.

- Computation’s main constraints: boundness and locality (paper from Hernandez-Quiroz and Raymundo Morado).

- Aphorisms and autoreference (Gabriel Sandu and Hinttika)

- Feferman on Turing

- Is Sieg’s paper and the question of “finite machine=effective procedure” a tautology? In fact such an approach seems to be one of the most strict versions of the Turing Thesis, and even though both Church and Turing probably did propose it in such a strict sense, extensive versions of the thesis have traditionaly covered more content, but even when it is strictly stated that there is still space for a thesis, it is neither proved nor provable from my point of view, and most authors would concur, though some clearly would not. I will comment on this more extensively later, since this was one of my Master’s topics and merits a post by itself.

- Putnam’s thought experiment on cutting all sensorial inputs. Solution: It is impossible in practice. However, machines are an example in a sense, and that is why we do not recognize intelligence in them – they are deprived of  sensorial capabilities.

Yes, Godel found an inconsistency in the U.S. constitution. My answer: One? Certainly a bunch. That’s why we need lawyers, who make them even worse.

A paper of mine in French on this subject is already in arXiv: “Universality on Real Computation”. Chris Moore called my attention to his paper entitled “Recursion Theory on the Reals and Continuous-time Computation” ,  which arrives at similar results using a different approach. A paper I’m writing in English on this subject, and which I have been discussing with several people, is forthcoming.  A preliminary powerpoint presentation that I used when presenting on the topic to Gregory Chaitin is available here:Universality on Real Computation In computability theory, the theory of real computation deals with hypothetical abstract machines capable of infinite precision. They operate on the set of real numbers, most of which are non-computable by a Turing machine. These hypothetical computing machines can be viewed as idealised analog computers or differential machines. The question I am interested in concerns the consequences of computing on the set of real numbers for current foundational concepts in traditional computation,  for example universality. I have found that an infinite number -possibly denumerable- of  universal real computers of varying power allows what I have called “intrinsic universality” (there is another definition of intrinsic universality related to dynamical systems and universal computation), since real numbers are not bounded in complexity and there is therefore one for each class of complexity. However, taking the complete set of real numbers, what I claim is that a single and ultimate universal machine for real computation is not possible, since for each proposed universal real computer A –with pre-fixed real numbers R=r_1,r_2,…,r_n – it suffices to calculate the maximal Turing degree of the set of the real numbers involved, let’s say O_n, to conceive a new real computer B able to compute numbers of higher Turing degree, let’s say O_m with m>n, which the given universal real machine A won’t be able to emulate– which contradicts the definition of a universal abstract real computer. Therefore A won’t be able to emulate (in the way conceived for defining universality in the traditional Turing model)  any other real machine B which belongs to the same set –the real numbers– (which evidently can be seen as their class of languages) unless it allows non-recursive functions going through all the levels of the arithmetical and hyper-arithmetical hierarchy. In other words, real computation does not allow universality, which is the very foundation of computer science unless we take into consideration non-recursive functions of arbitrary power, which adds an aditional problem to the conception of a universal device and the convergence of real computing models, unlike the traditional model based on recursive functions theory and Turing machines. However, in real computation there is a place for relative universality, which is very rich in ideas and theories and gives rise to a hierarchical Church-Turing type thesis for each level of the arithmetical and hyper-arithmetical hierarchy. So talking about the universal abstract device E_n for example–because of  the arithmetical level E_n– for each n natural number would make sense, unlike a device E able to behave like any other E_n for any n natural number, which would need at least one function or the composite of several functions able to attain any arbitrary degree of computability. In other words, E wouldn’t be a field since it is not closed under the set of operators of the defined E.

Here is a related paper entitled on “The complexity of real recursive functions” by Manuel Lameiras Campagnolo. In France, “M. Olivier Bournez” has a particular interest in real computation, in particular analog and hybrid systems.Other important authors in the field include : Karp, da Costa, Blum, Cucker, Shub and Smale. Felix da Costa has let me know that  he is working on something related to my ideas on universality in real computation and relative universality.It is important to say that being interested in real computation is not the same thing as being an “hyper-computationalist”. In fact, some if not most  of the above authors think that real computation would at best be only as powerful as the digital models.  Their interest in the field is mainly operational, in the sense that these types of  machines perform operations commonly related to fields like real anaylisis.

This is a report on the Computability in Europe Conference (CiE), held at the University of Swansea, Wales in the United Kingdom in July 2006.

I attended a mini-course on Quantum Computing given by Julia Kempe, a lecture on the Church-Turing thesis by Martin Davis– who defended it against proposed models of hypercomputation– and a  lecture on Proof Theory. Another very interesting lecture was on Godel and Turing’s remarks on the Human Mind (the dichotomy argument from Godel and the mechanistic vision from Turing). Among other noteworthy lectures were Samuel Buss’ on Complexity of Proofs, John Dawson’s on Godel in Computability, Wilfried Sieg’s on the Concept of Mechanical Procedure in Godel and Turing, as well as many presentations on hypercomputability and computing over the reals. I met people whom I had only known through email exchanges, like Felix Da Costa from the Technological Institute of Lisbon, Robert Meyer professor emeritus at the National University of Australia, and Julia Kempe from France who is a renowned researcher in the quantum computing field and with whom I shared some doubts I had concerning where the restrictions in Quantum Computing lay which constrained its power to the set of recursive functions. I also met people from SUNY who are doing interesting research on Turing-computation, studying isomorphisms between Oracle machines and the relation with the Tenenbaum theorem upon the uniqueness of the recursive model of PA (Peano Arithmetic). Many lectures were given on computing over infinite time and space and computing at the limit of the general relativity theory. The conference was intended to take the pulse of the field of hypercomputation in Europe and worldwide.

NECSI/ICCS Conference Report, Quincy, Greater Boston, USA, July 2006.

First lesson: For every complex problem there is a simple, neat, wrong solution.

I attended talks given by Ed Fredkin on Finite Nature, Lazlo Barabasi on Complex Networks, Christoph Teuscher on Biology and Computation and John Nash on his research upon Game Theory.
* Ed Fredkin presented a table salt 3-D cellular automata model that fulfils all physical constraints on symmetry and energy conservation. The model is surprisely Turing-universal. As a reminder, the Zuse-Fredkin Thesis is a Church-type thesis which claims additionally that the universe being a Cellular Automaton can be understood in terms of the evolution of  Cellular Automata. An interesting paper entitled “Church-Turing Thesis is Almost Equivalent to Zuse-Fredkin Thesis” by Plamen Petrov is available here>
http://digitalphysics.org/~ppetrov/
And much more information on the interesting ideas of Ed Fredkin is available in
http://www.math.usf.edu/~eclark/ANKOS_zuse_fredkin_thesis.html and on  Ed Fredkin homepage at MIT, which  includes some remarks on why this thesis is not in agreement with  Stephen Wolfram’s, since Wolfram does not intend to imply that the universe is a classical cellular automaton but rather conceives of   a discrete universe based on systems performing simple rules and producing all the complex behavior we find in nature. Such systems are comparable to Turing machines, tag systems, axioms or any other equivalent system.
* In his lecture, Lazlo Barabasi claimed that behind all complex systems there are complex networks, in particular Free-Scale Networks (with a few nodes very well connected with others, and many nodes weakly connected). These nets are efficient and robust (even minus random nodes they remains connected)except under attack (provided the best connected nodes are targeted).
* Christoph Teuscher gave a lecture on computation inspired by biology. However, as he himself admitted, it was not his area of expertise.
* John Nash presented his research on Game Theory using Mathematica as an engine.
* I met Hava Siegelmann and one of her fellows, Yariv, who is working on Artificial Intelligence. Siegelmann worked some years ago (while completing  her PhD dissertation) upon a model of computation called Analog Recurrent Neural Network or just ARNN which, under certain circumstances,  is able to compute more functions than the set of recursive functions , which are those computed by the Turing machines. She is now working on topics related to Molecular Biology. I asked her about the forceful  critiques delivered by traditional logicians like Martin Davis, who wrote a paper entitled “The Myth of HyperComputation.”    The target of most of these critiques is a certain circular argument—to compute more than Turing machines it is necessary to use non-Turing computable weights previously coded into the neural network. It has been known for a long time that the set of all real numbers is able to encode any arbitrary language, even if it is non-Turing computable. What is remarkable from my point of view is her result relating to complexity classes, since weights with lower complexity are able to compute a higher class when  used in those networks. Aditionally she argued that even with a stochastic function her networks are able to solve non-computable functions. Recently I discussed the fact with Stephen Wolfram and we agreed that she is assuming strong randomness. I would say however that Siegelmann’s work is much more beatiful from a complexity point of view than from a “hypercomputational” viewpoint. In her book published under the title “Neural Networks and Analog Computation: Beyond the Turing Limit ” she proves that: a) there exists an universal neural network with only 9 neurons, and b) that  p(r) suffices to compute a non-computable function, where r is an arbitrary complete real number but p(r) represents the first p digits of the expansion of r–which means that linear precision suffices to achieve “super-Turing” capabilities, assuming that the neural network can have access to any possible real number before the computation. In other words this seems to be true only if all possible real numbers are allowed a priori (just as in the Turing machines an unbounded tape is neccesary to carry out all recursive languages, and neural networks with rational numbers as weights do not compute the same set of functions as neural networks with whole numbers as weights, the first having been  proven by Klenee to compute the same set as Turing machines and the second  to compute the same set of languages as finite automata, those called regular languages).
I exchanged ideas with some other interesting people, like an engineer from the Space and Airbone Systems Department of Raytheon. And I met John Nash Jr. during the gala dinner  at which he was presented with an award  for his contributions to  Complexity Theory, mainly honoring his work relating to Game Theory.